ecpolicyЭкономическая политикаEconomic Policy1994-51242411-2658Economic Policy10.18288/1994-5124-2021-6-8-33ecpolicy-113Research ArticleМакроэкономикаMacroeconomicsПрозрачность монетарной политики и успешность инфляционного таргетированияTransparency of Monetary Policy and Success of Inflation TargetingКартаевФ. С.KartaevPhilip S.

Филипп Сергеевич Картаев — доктор экономических наук, доцент, заведующий кафедрой математических методов анализа экономики

119991, Москва, ул. Ленинские Горы, 1, стр. 46

Philip S. KARTAEV. Dr Sci. (Econ.), Associate Professor

1–46, Leninskie Gory, Moscow, 119991

kartaev@econ.msu.ruЛеденёваЕ. Е.LednevaElena Ye.

Елена Евгеньевна Леденёва — студент

119991, Москва, ул. Ленинские Горы, 1, стр. 46

Elena Ye. LEDNEVA

1–46, Leninskie Gory, Moscow, 119991

elenaeledenyova@gmail.comМГУ им. М. В. ЛомоносоваРоссияLomonosov Moscow State UniversityRussian Federation202128122021166833Copyright © Картаев Ф.С., Леденёва Е.Е., 20212021Картаев Ф.С., Леденёва Е.Е.Kartaev P.S., Ledneva E.Y.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://www.ecpolicy.ru/jour/article/view/113

Цель работы — определить, влияет ли прозрачность монетарной политики на вероятность достижения цели по инфляции в рамках режима инфляционного таргетирования. Под прозрачностью в статье понимается степень полноты информации, которую центральный банк представляет общественности: информации о собственных целях, стратегии, прогнозируемом состоянии экономики и процедурах принятия решений. Для эконометрических расчетов в качестве меры прозрачности выбран индекс прозрачности денежных властей Динсера и Эйхенгрина. Использованы межстрановые панельные данные по 32 странам, каждая из которых на момент проведения исследования придерживалась политики инфляционного таргетирования, применены логит-модели бинарного выбора со случайными и фиксированными эффектами, а также подходы, опирающиеся на инструментальные переменные. Выявлено устойчивое влияние прозрачности политики на успешность реализации инфляционного таргетирования. По мере увеличения открытости действий денежных властей вероятность достижения цели по инфляции также становится выше. Выявленные эмпирические свидетельства согласуются с теоретической литературой: прозрачная монетарная политика укрепляет репутацию центрального банка, помогает ему успешнее управлять инфляционными ожиданиями фирм и домашних хозяйств, снижает эффект переноса валютного курса и в целом позволяет денежно-кредитной трансмиссии работать лучше. Это влияние, однако, является немонотонным: при достижении некоторого порогового уровня позитивный эффект от дополнительной прозрачности политики оказывается исчерпанным, и дальнейшее ее увеличение может даже снижать эффективность инфляционного таргетирования. В исследовании получены оценки этого порогового уровня, которые были сопоставлены с текущим уровнем прозрачности денежно-кредитной политики Центрального банка Российской Федерации. Продемонстрировано, что в настоящий момент степень прозрачности действий российских денежных властей является оптимальной. Полученные результаты могут быть полезны центральным банкам при выборе уровня открытости процедур реализации монетарной политики.

The purpose of this paper is to determine whether the transparency of monetary policy affects the likelihood of achieving the inflation target under the inflation targeting regime. Transparency is the degree of completeness of information that the central bank provides to the public—information about its own strategy, forecasts and decision-making procedures. The transparency index by Nergiz Dincer and Barry Eichengreen is used for econometric calculations. The study is based on cross-country panel data for 32 countries, each of which adhered to an inflation targeting policy at the time of the study. Calculations are based on binary choice logit models with random and fixed effects, as well as on instrumental variables. The paper reveals a steady influence of policy transparency on the success of inflation targeting implementation. As the openness of monetary authorities’ actions increases, the probability of achieving the inflation target also becomes higher. The revealed empirical evidence is consistent with the theoretical literature: transparent monetary policy strengthens the reputation of the central bank, and helps it manage inflation expectations. This influence, however, is non-monotonous: when a certain threshold level is reached, the positive effect of additional policy transparency is exhausted and its further increase may even reduce the effectiveness of inflation targeting. The study obtains estimates of this threshold level, which are then compared with the current level of transparency of the Bank of Russia monetary policy. At the moment the degree of transparency of the Russian monetary authorities’ actions is optimal. The results obtained can be useful for central banks when choosing the level of openness of monetary policy implementation procedures.

денежно-кредитная политикаиндекс Динсера и Эйхенгринапанельные данныеinflation targetingmonetary policytransparency of monetary policypanel dataReferencesКартаев Ф. С., Лунева И. М. Взболтать, но не смешивать: сравнение эффективности чистого и смешанного инфляционного таргетирования // Деньги и кредит. 2018. Т. 77. № 3. С. 65–75.Kartaev P., Luneva I. Vzboltat’, no ne smeshivat’: sravnenie effektivnosti chistogo i smeshannogo inflyatsionnogo targetirovaniya [Shaken, Not Stirred: Comparing the Effectiveness of Pure and Hybrid Inflation Targeting]. Den’gi i kredit [Russian Journal of Money and Finance], 2018, vol. 77, no. 3, pp. 65-75. DOI:10.31477/rjmf.201803.65. (In Russ.)Adrian T., Laxton M. D., Obstfeld M. M. Advancing the Frontiers of Monetary Policy. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2018.Adrian T., Laxton M. D., Obstfeld M. M. Advancing the Frontiers of Monetary Policy. Washington, DC, International Monetary Fund, 2018. DOI:10.5089/9781484325940.071.Al-Marhubi F. A. Corruption and Inflation // Economics Letters. 2000. Vol. 66. No 2. P. 199–202.Al-Marhubi F. A. Corruption and Inflation. Economics Letters, 2000, vol. 66, no. 2, pp. 199- 202.Baeriswyl R., Cornand C. Reducing Overreaction to Central Banks’ Disclosures: Theory and Experiment // Journal of the European Economic Association. 2014. Vol. 12. No 4. P. 1087–1126.Baeriswyl R., Cornand C. Reducing Overreaction to Central Banks’ Disclosures: Theory and Experiment. Journal of the European Economic Association, 2014, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 1087-1126. DOI:10.1111/jeea.12077.Candia B., Coibion O., Gorodnichenko Y. Communication and the Beliefs of Economic Agents. NBER Working Papers. No 27800. 2020.Candia B., Coibion O., Gorodnichenko Y. Communication and the Beliefs of Economic Agents. NBER Working Papers, no. 27800, 2020.Christelis D., Georgarakos D., Jappelli T., van Rooij M. Trust in the Central Bank and Inflation Expectation. European Central Bank Working Paper Series. No 2375. 2020.Christelis D., Georgarakos D., Jappelli T., van Rooij M. Trust in the Central Bank and Inflation Expectation. European Central Bank Working Paper Series, no. 2375, 2020.Coibion O., Gorodnichenko Y. Information Rigidity and the Expectations Formation Process: A Simple Framework and New Facts // American Economic Review. 2015. Vol. 105. No 8. P. 2644–2678.Coibion O., Gorodnichenko Y. Information Rigidity and the Expectations Formation Process: A Simple Framework and New Facts. American Economic Review, 2015, vol. 105, no. 8, pp. 2644-2678. DOI:10.1257/aer.20110306.Coibion O., Gorodnichenko Y. What Can Survey Forecasts Tell Us About Information Rigidities? // Journal of Political Economy. 2012. Vol. 120. No 1. P. 116–159.Coibion O., Gorodnichenko Y. What Can Survey Forecasts Tell Us About Information Rigidities? Journal of Political Economy, 2012, vol. 120, no. 1, pp. 116-159. DOI:10.1086/665662.Cukierman A. Accountability, Credibility, Transparency and Stabilization Policy in the Eurosystem // The Impact of EMU on Europe and the Developing Countries / C. Wyplosz (ed.). Geneva: Graduate Institute of International Studies, 2001. Chapter 3.Cukierman A. Accountability, Credibility, Transparency and Stabilization Policy in the Eurosystem. In: Wyplosz C. (ed.). The Impact of EMU on Europe and the Developing Countries. Geneva, Graduate Institute of International Studies, 2001, chapter 3. DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199245314.003.0003.Cukierman A., Webb S. B., Neyapti B. Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes // The World Bank Economic Review. 1992. Vol. 6. No 3. P. 353–398.Cukierman A., Webb S. B., Neyapti B. Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes. The World Bank Economic Review, 1992, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 353-398.Dincer N. N., Eichengreen B. Central Bank Transparency and Independence: Updates and New Measures // International Journal of Central Banking. 2014. Vol. 10. No 1. P. 189–259.Dincer N. N., Eichengreen B. Central Bank Transparency and Independence: Updates and New Measures. International Journal of Central Banking, 2014, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 189-259.Dincer N., Eichengreen B., Geraats P. Transparency of Monetary Policy in the Postcrisis World // The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Central Banking / D. G. Mayes, P. L. Siklos, J.-E. Sturm (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. P. 287–336.Dincer N., Eichengreen B., Geraats P. Transparency of Monetary Policy in the Postcrisis World. In: Mayes D. G., Siklos P. L., Sturm J.-E. (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Central Banking. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2019, pp. 287-336. DOI:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190626198.013.10.Diouf I., Pépin D. Gender and Central Banking // Economic Modelling. 2017. Vol. 61(C). P. 193–206.Diouf I., Pépin D. Gender and Central Banking. Economic Modelling, 2017, vol. 61(C), pp. 193-206. DOI:10.1016/j.econmod.2016.12.006.Eijffinger S. C. W., Geraats P. M. How Transparent Are Central Banks? // European Journal of Political Economy. 2006. Vol. 22. No 1. P. 1–21.Eijffinger S. C. W., Geraats P. M. How Transparent Are Central Banks? European Journal of Political Economy, 2006, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 1-21.Eusepi S., Preston B. Central Bank Communication and Expectations Stabilization // American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics. 2010. Vol. 2. No 3. P. 235–271.Eusepi S., Preston B. Central Bank Communication and Expectations Stabilization. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2010, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 235-271. DOI:10.1257/mac.2.3.235.Farvaque E., Stanek P., Hammadou H. Selecting Your Inflation Targeters: Background and Performance of Monetary Policy Committee Members // German Economic Review. 2011. Vol. 12. No 2. P. 223–238.Farvaque E., Stanek P., Hammadou H. Selecting Your Inflation Targeters: Background and Performance of Monetary Policy Committee Members. German Economic Review, 2011, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 223-238.Farvaque E., Stanek P., Vigeant S. On the Performance of Monetary Policy Committees // Kyklos. 2014. Vol. 67. No 2. P. 177–203.Farvaque E., Stanek P., Vigeant S. On the Performance of Monetary Policy Committees. Kyklos, 2014, vol. 67, no. 2, pp. 177-203. DOI:10.1111/kykl.12049.Fehrler S., Hughes N. How Transparency Kills Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment // American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2018. Vol. 10. No 1. P. 181–209.Fehrler S., Hughes N. How Transparency Kills Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2018, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 181-209. DOI:10.1257/mic.20160046.Gaballo G. Rational Inattention to News: The Perils of Forward Guidance // American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics. 2016. Vol. 8. No 1. P. 42–97.Gaballo G. Rational Inattention to News: The Perils of Forward Guidance. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2016, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 42-97. DOI:10.1257/mac.20130337.Geraats P. M. Central Bank Transparency // The Economic Journal. 2002. Vol. 112. No 483. P. F532–F565.Geraats P. M. Central Bank Transparency. The Economic Journal, 2002, vol. 112, no. 483, pp. F532-F565. DOI:10.1111/1468-0297.00082.Gersbach H., Hahn V. Should the Individual Voting Records of Central Bankers Be Published? // Social Choice and Welfare. 2008. Vol. 30. No 4. P. 655–683.Gersbach H., Hahn V. Should the Individual Voting Records of Central Bankers Be Published? Social Choice and Welfare, 2008, vol. 30, no. 4, pp. 655-683. DOI:10.1007/s00355-007-0259-7.Göhlmann S., Vaubel R. The Educational and Occupational Background of Central Bankers and Its Effect on Inflation: An Empirical Analysis // European Economic Review. 2007. Vol. 51. No 4. P. 925–941.Göhlmann S., Vaubel R. The Educational and Occupational Background of Central Bankers and Its Effect on Inflation: An Empirical Analysis. European Economic Review, 2007, vol. 51, no. 4, pp. 925-941.Gosselin M. A. Central Bank Performance Under Inflation Targeting. Bank of Canada Staff Working Papers. No 07-18. 2007.Gosselin M. A. Central Bank Performance Under Inflation Targeting. Bank of Canada Staff Working Papers, no. 07-18, 2007.Honkapohja S., Mitra K. Comparing Inflation and Price-Level Targeting: The Role of Forward Guidance and Transparency // The Manchester School. 2015. Vol. 83. No S2. P. 27–59.Honkapohja S., Mitra K. Comparing Inflation and Price-Level Targeting: The Role of Forward Guidance and Transparency. The Manchester School, 2015, vol. 83, no. S2, pp. 27-59. DOI:10.1111/manc.12113.Hove S., Tchana F. T., Mama A. T. Do Monetary, Fiscal and Financial Institutions Really Matter for Inflation Targeting in Emerging Market Economies? // Research in International Business and Finance. 2017. Vol. 39(PA). P. 128–149.Hove S., Tchana F. T., Mama A. T. Do Monetary, Fiscal and Financial Institutions Really Matter for Inflation Targeting in Emerging Market Economies? Research in International Business and Finance, 2017, vol. 39(PA), pp. 128-149. DOI:10.1016/j.ribaf.2016.07.025.Imam P. A. Shock from Graying: Is the Demographic Shift Weakening Monetary Policy Effectiveness. International Monetary Fund Working Paper. No 13/191. 2013.Imam P. A. Shock from Graying: Is the Demographic Shift Weakening Monetary Policy Effectiveness. International Monetary Fund Working Paper, no. 13/191, 2013.Issing O. The Eurosystem: Transparent and Accountable: Or “Willem in Euroland”. CEPR Policy Paper. No 2. 1999.Issing O. The Eurosystem: Transparent and Accountable: Or “Willem in Euroland”. CEPR Policy Paper, no. 2, 1999.Kool C. J. M., Middeldorp M., Rosenkranz S. Central Bank Transparency and the Crowding Out of Private Information in Financial Markets // Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. 2011. Vol. 43. No 4. P. 765–774.Kool C. J. M., Middeldorp M., Rosenkranz S. Central Bank Transparency and the Crowding Out of Private Information in Financial Markets. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2011, vol. 43, no. 4, pp. 765-774. DOI:10.1111/j.1538-4616.2011.00395.x.Levy G. Decision Making in Committees: Transparency, Reputation, and Voting Rules // American Economic Review. 2007. Vol. 97. No 1. P. 150–168.Levy G. Decision Making in Committees: Transparency, Reputation, and Voting Rules. American Economic Review, 2007, vol. 97, no. 1, pp. 150-168. DOI:10.1257/aer.97.1.150.Mishkin F. S. Can Central Bank Transparency Go Too Far? NBER Working Papers. No 10829. 2004.Mishkin F. S. Can Central Bank Transparency Go Too Far? NBER Working Papers, no. 10829, 2004.Morris S., Shin H. S. Central Bank Transparency and the Signal Value of Prices // Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 2005. Vol. 36. No 2. P. 1–66.Morris S., Shin H. S. Central Bank Transparency and the Signal Value of Prices. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2005, vol. 36, no. 2, pp. 1-66.Morris S., Shin H. S. Social Value of Public Information // American Economic Review. 2002. Vol. 92. No 5. P. 1521–1534.Morris S., Shin H. S. Social Value of Public Information. American Economic Review, 2002, vol. 92, no. 5, pp. 1521-1534. DOI:10.1257/000282802762024610.Oikonomou G., Papadamou S., Spyromitros E. The Effect of Central Bank Transparency on Inflation Persistence // Economics and Business Letters. 2021. Vol. 10. No 1. P. 58–68.Oikonomou G., Papadamou S., Spyromitros E. The Effect of Central Bank Transparency on Inflation Persistence. Economics and Business Letters, 2021, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 58-68. DOI:10.17811/ebl.10.1.2021.58-68.Papadamou S., Sidiropoulos M., Spyromitros E. Central Bank Transparency and the Interest Rate Channel: Evidence from Emerging Economies // Economic Modelling. 2015. Vol. 48(C). P. 167–174.Papadamou S., Sidiropoulos M., Spyromitros E. Central Bank Transparency and the Interest Rate Channel: Evidence from Emerging Economies. Economic Modelling, 2015, vol. 48(C), pp. 167-174. DOI:10.1016/j.econmod.2014.10.016.Rumler F., Valderrama M. T. Inflation Literacy and Inflation Expectations: Evidence from Austrian Household Survey Data // Economic Modelling. 2020. Vol. 87(C). P. 8–23.Rumler F., Valderrama M. T. Inflation Literacy and Inflation Expectations: Evidence from Austrian Household Survey Data. Economic Modelling, 2020, vol. 87(C), pp. 8-23. DOI:10.1016/j.econmod.2019.06.016.Salle I., Sénégas M. A., Yıldızoğlu M. How Transparent About Its Inflation Target Should a Central Bank Be? // Journal of Evolutionary Economics. 2019. Vol. 29. No 1. P. 391–427.Salle I., Sénégas M. A., Yıldızoğlu M. How Transparent About Its Inflation Target Should a Central Bank Be? Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 2019, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 391-427. DOI:10.1007/s00191-018-0558-4.Salle I., Yıldızoğlu M., Sénégas M. A. Inflation Targeting in a Learning Economy: An ABM Perspective // Economic Modelling. 2013. Vol. 34(C). P. 114–128.Salle I., Yıldızoğlu M., Sénégas M. A. Inflation Targeting in a Learning Economy: An ABM Perspective. Economic Modelling, 2013, vol. 34(C), pp. 114-128. DOI:10.1016/j.econmod.2013.01.031.Sassi S., Gasmi A. The Dynamic Relationship Between Corruption—Inflation: Evidence from Panel Vector Autoregression // The Japanese Economic Review. 2017. Vol. 68. No 4. P. 458–469.Sassi S., Gasmi A. The Dynamic Relationship Between Corruption - Inflation: Evidence from Panel Vector Autoregression. The Japanese Economic Review, 2017, vol. 68, no. 4, pp. 458-469. DOI:10.1111/jere.12134.Simon H. A. Models of Bounded Rationality: Empirically Grounded Economic Reason. Vol. 3. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997.Simon H. A. Models of Bounded Rationality: Empirically Grounded Economic Reason, vol. 3. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1997.Sims C. A. Implications of Rational Inattention // Journal of Monetary Economics. 2003. Vol. 50. No 3. P. 665–690.Sims C. A. Implications of Rational Inattention. Journal of Monetary Economics, 2003, vol. 50, no. 3, pp. 665-690. DOI:10.1016/S0304-3932(03)00029-1.Stock J. H., Yogo M. Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear IV Regression // Identification and Inference for Econometric Models: Essays in Honor of Thomas Rothenberg / D. W. K. Andrews, J. H. Stock (eds.). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005. P. 80–108.Stock J. H., Yogo M. Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear IV Regression. In: Andrews D. W. K., Stock J. H. (eds.). Identification and Inference for Econometric Models: Essays in Honor of Thomas Rothenberg. N. Y., NY, Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 80-108.Svensson L. E. O. Inflation Targeting // Handbook of Monetary Economics / B. M. Friedman, М. Woodford (eds.). Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2010. Vol. 3. P. 1237–1302.Svensson L. E. O. Inflation Targeting. In: Friedman B. M., Woodford M. (eds.). Handbook of Monetary Economics. Amsterdam, Elsevier, 2010, vol. 3, pp. 1237-1302.Trabelsi E., Hichri W. Central Bank Transparency with (Semi-)Public Information: Laboratory Experiments // Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics. 2021. Vol. 90(C).Trabelsi E., Hichri W. Central Bank Transparency with (Semi-)Public Information: Laboratory Experiments. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 2021, vol. 90(C). DOI:10.1016/j.socec.2020.101645.Van der Cruijsen C. A. B., Eijffinger S. C. W., Hoogduin L. H. Optimal Central Bank Transparency // Journal of International Money and Finance. 2010. Vol. 29. No 8. P. 1482–1507.Van der Cruijsen C. A. B., Eijffinger S. C. W., Hoogduin L. H. Optimal Central Bank Transparency. Journal of International Money and Finance, 2010, vol. 29, no. 8, pp. 1482-1507.Walsh C. E. Accountability, Transparency, and Inflation Targeting // Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. 2003. Vol. 35. No 5. P. 829–849.Walsh C. E. Accountability, Transparency, and Inflation Targeting. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2003, vol. 35, no. 5, pp. 829-849.Walsh C. E. Transparency, Flexibility, and Inflation Targeting // Series on Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies: Monetary Policy Under Inflation Targeting / F. S. Miskin, K. Schmidt-Hebbel, N. Loayza (eds.). No 11. 2007. P. 227–263.Walsh C. E. Transparency, Flexibility, and Inflation Targeting. Miskin F. S., Schmidt-Hebbel K., Loayza N. (eds.). Series on Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies: Monetary Policy Under Inflation Targeting, 2007, no. 11, pp. 227-263.Weber C. S. Central Bank Transparency and Inflation (Volatility)—New Evidence // International Economics and Economic Policy. 2018. Vol. 15. No 1. P. 21–67.Weber C. S. Central Bank Transparency and Inflation (Volatility) - New Evidence. International Economics and Economic Policy, 2018, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 21-67. DOI:10.1007/s10368-016-0365-z.Woodford M. Imperfect Common Knowledge and the Effects of Monetary Policy. NBER Working Papers. No 8673. 2001.Woodford M. Imperfect Common Knowledge and the Effects of Monetary Policy. NBER Working Papers, no. 8673, 2001.Yudaeva K. Frontiers of Monetary Policy: Global Trends and Russian Inflation Targeting Practices (Review of the Book “Advancing the Frontiers of Monetary Policy” ed. by T. Adrian, D. Laxton, M. Obstfeld) // Деньги и кредит [Russian Journal of Money and Finance]. 2018. Vol. 77. No 2. P. 95–100.Yudaeva K. Frontiers of Monetary Policy: Global Trends and Russian Inflation Targeting Practices (Review of the Book “Advancing the Frontiers of Monetary Policy” ed. by T. Adrian, D. Laxton, M. Obstfeld). Russian Journal of Money and Finance, 2018, vol. 77, no. 2, pp. 95-100. DOI:10.31477/rjmf.201802.95.Zhuravskaya E., Petrova M., Enikolopov R. Political Effects of the Internet and Social Media // Annual Review of Economics. 2020. Vol. 12. No 1. P. 415–438.Zhuravskaya E., Petrova M., Enikolopov R. Political Effects of the Internet and Social Media. Annual Review of Economics, 2020, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 415-438. DOI:10.1146/annureveconomics-081919-050239.

The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.