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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">ecpolicy</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Экономическая политика</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Economic Policy</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">1994-5124</issn><issn pub-type="epub">2411-2658</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Economic Policy</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.18288/1994-5124-2024-6-6-25</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">ecpolicy-198</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>ДЕНЕЖНО-КРЕДИТНАЯ ПОЛИТИКА</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>MONETARY POLICY</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>The Forward Guidance Puzzle and Anchored Inflation Expectations</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>The Forward Guidance Puzzle and Anchored Inflation Expectations</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1957-4728</contrib-id><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Drobysheva</surname><given-names>А. D.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Drobysheva</surname><given-names>A. D.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Alexandra D. Drobysheva - Research Intern at the International Laboratory for Macroeconomic Analysis.</p><p>11, Pokrovskiy bul., Moscow, 109028</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Alexandra D. Drobysheva - Research Intern at the International Laboratory for Macroeconomic Analysis.</p><p>11, Pokrovskiy bul., Moscow, 109028</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">drobysheva@hse.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1762-1773</contrib-id><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Merzlyakov</surname><given-names>S. А.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Merzlyakov</surname><given-names>S. A.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Sergey A. Merzlyakov - Cand. Sci. (Econ.), Assistant Professor of the Department of Theoretical Economics at the Faculty of Economic Sciences, Deputy Head of the International Laboratory for Macroeconomic Analysis.</p><p>11, Pokrovskiy bul., Moscow, 109028</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Sergey A. Merzlyakov - Cand. Sci. (Econ.), Assistant Professor of the Department of Theoretical Economics at the Faculty of Economic Sciences, Deputy Head of the International Laboratory for Macroeconomic Analysis.</p><p>11, Pokrovskiy bul., Moscow, 109028</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">smerzlyakov@hse.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>National Research University Higher School of Economics</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>National Research University Higher School of Economics</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2024</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>27</day><month>12</month><year>2024</year></pub-date><volume>19</volume><issue>6</issue><fpage>6</fpage><lpage>25</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Drobysheva А.D., Merzlyakov S.А., 2024</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2024</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Drobysheva А.D., Merzlyakov S.А.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Drobysheva A.D., Merzlyakov S.A.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.ecpolicy.ru/jour/article/view/198">https://www.ecpolicy.ru/jour/article/view/198</self-uri><abstract><p>In recent years, central banks have turned to forward guidance as a key tool of monetary policy. However, standard DSGE models overestimate the impact of forward guidance on the economy, a phenomenon known as the “forward guidance puzzle.” In the model employed, the reaction of firms to a central bank’s announcements depends on the degree of anchoring of inflation expectations. When firms do not revise their forecasts much in response to inflation surprises, the effects of forward guidance shocks are attenuated. Furthermore, an increase in the Taylor rule coefficients implies a faster reversion of inflation and output to their steady state levels, thus resulting in more anchored inflation expectations and dampened effects of forward guidance announcements. However, the central bank's exclusive focus on price stability eliminates forward guidance effects. This paper also studies the dependence of forward guidance on fiscal policy, which arises in a nonRicardian economy. We show that the initial effects of the central bank’s announcements become considerably stronger when steady state debt is positive, whereas a stronger reaction of fiscal policy to debt fluctuations attenuates the power of forward guidance.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>In recent years, central banks have turned to forward guidance as a key tool of monetary policy. However, standard DSGE models overestimate the impact of forward guidance on the economy, a phenomenon known as the “forward guidance puzzle.” In the model employed, the reaction of firms to a central bank’s announcements depends on the degree of anchoring of inflation expectations. When firms do not revise their forecasts much in response to inflation surprises, the effects of forward guidance shocks are attenuated. Furthermore, an increase in the Taylor rule coefficients implies a faster reversion of inflation and output to their steady state levels, thus resulting in more anchored inflation expectations and dampened effects of forward guidance announcements. However, the central bank's exclusive focus on price stability eliminates forward guidance effects. This paper also studies the dependence of forward guidance on fiscal policy, which arises in a nonRicardian economy. We show that the initial effects of the central bank’s announcements become considerably stronger when steady state debt is positive, whereas a stronger reaction of fiscal policy to debt fluctuations attenuates the power of forward guidance.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>forward guidance</kwd><kwd>inflation expectations</kwd><kwd>bounded rationality</kwd><kwd>trend inflation</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>forward guidance</kwd><kwd>inflation expectations</kwd><kwd>bounded rationality</kwd><kwd>trend inflation</kwd></kwd-group><funding-group><funding-statement xml:lang="ru">This article was prepared as part of the HSE University Basic Research Program</funding-statement><funding-statement xml:lang="en">This article was prepared as part of the HSE University Basic Research Program</funding-statement></funding-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Afrouzi H., Yang C. 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