This article identifies major trends in the development of competition and antitrust policy over the past ten years and relates them to standard antitrust objectives. The study concentrates on competition policy with emphasis on how antitrust measures operate as one component in it. The hypothesis that there is regulatory bias in contemporary antitrust policy is explored and assessed in terms of a broader debate about the prevalence of a fundamentalist approach in economic policy. Several case studies are adduced to illustrate the following trends: increased focus by antimonopoly authorities on digital markets, pro-competitive regulation of those markets, and antitrust investigations into digital platforms. The article continues with a discussion of the proliferation of populist measures associated with antitrust objectives. The growing use of competition policy for solving social problems and for purposes beyond those of traditional competition policy (such as governing technology transfer and addressing protectionism) is examined. Each of the trends described are shown to exhibit inconsistencies between the measures taken and the policy objective of enhancing competition with the result that regulation of digital markets intensifies (and becomes direct regulation in some instances), relies on normative rather than objective analysis, and leads to implementation of industrial policy through antitrust measures. The progression toward direct regulation bolsters the hypothesis that regulatory fundamentalism has become quite prevalent as part of competition policy in recent years.