ecpolicyЭкономическая политикаEconomic Policy1994-51242411-2658Economic Policy10.18288/1994-5124-2022-6-68-89ecpolicy-47Research ArticleСтатьиМотивы и стратегии мажоритарных инвесторов: влияние на корпоративное управлениеMotives and Strategies of the Largest Investors: Influence on Corporate Governancehttps://orcid.org/0000-0001-5919-2332КокореваМ. С.KokorevaM. S.

Мария Сергеевна Кокорева, Кандидат экономических наук, доцент Школы финансов, научный сотрудник лаборатории корпоративных финансов

109028, Москва, Покровский бульвар, 11

Maria S. Kokoreva, Cand. Sci. (Econ.), Associate Professor, School of Finance, Research Fellow

11, Pokrovskiy bul’var, Moscow, 109028

mskokoreva@gmail.comСтепановаА. Н.StepanovaA. N.

Анастасия Николаевна Степанова, Кандидат экономических наук, доцент Школы финансов, научный сотрудник лаборатории корпоративных финансов

109028, Москва, Покровский бульвар, 11

Anastasia N. Stepanova, Cand. Sci. (Econ.), Associate Professor,School of Finance, Research Fellow

11, Pokrovskiy bul’var, Moscow, 109028

anastasianstepanova@gmail.comГайфеевБ. Р.BulatR. G.

Булат Рафикович Гайфеев, стажер лаборатории корпоративных финансов

109028, Москва, Покровский бульвар, 11

Bulat R. Gaifeev, Research Intern, Corporate Finance Center

11, Pokrovskiy bul’var, Moscow, 109028

gayfbulat17@gmail.comНациональный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики»РоссияCorporate Finance Center, National Research University Higher School of EconomicsRussian Federation2022281220221766889Copyright © Кокорева М.С., Степанова А.Н., Гайфеев Б.Р., 20222022Кокорева М.С., Степанова А.Н., Гайфеев Б.Р.Kokoreva M.S., Stepanova A.N., Bulat R.G.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://www.ecpolicy.ru/jour/article/view/47

В настоящее время в мире наблюдается рост концентрации собственности. В работе изучается этот феномен и его влияние на корпоративное управление и эффективность компании. Авторы учитывают тот факт, что институциональные инвесторы имеют разные цели и мотивы. Некоторые из них, желая оказывать влияние на стратегию компании, становятся активными участниками системы корпоративного управления; другие (ориентированные на краткосрочные цели) остаются пассивными инвесторами. В данном исследовании отдельно рассматривается влияние, оказываемое традиционными инвестиционными менеджерами и хедж-фондами, на корпоративное управление и эффективность компаний. На выборке нефинансовых компаний из индекса Russell 3000 с помощью регрессионного анализа панельных данных показано, что влияние мажоритарных акционеров на корпоративное управление и эффективность компании зависит от мотивов акционеров и их стратегий. Для оценки качества корпоративного управления построен индекс, который включает в себя показатели, отвечающие за глубину агентского конфликта, характеристики советов директоров и соблюдение прав акционеров. Авторы доказывают, что традиционные инвестиционные менеджеры, во-первых, предпочитают инвестировать в компании с уже высоким качеством корпоративного управления и, во-вторых, улучшают корпоративное управление в будущем, что приводит к росту эффективности компаний. Для хедж-фондов выявлена обратная зависимость. Хеджфонды с крупными пакетами акций негативно влияют на уровень корпоративного управления и не влияют на показатели эффективности компании. Таким образом, в работе показана значимость разных мотивов крупных инвесторов для компании в условиях растущей концентрации собственности.

Concentration of corporate ownership has increased worldwide during recent years, especially in the holdings of the largest investors. The paper examines this trend in order to understand how changes in the stakes of the largest shareholders affect corporate governance and performance. In order to take into account the different goals and motives among institutional investors, the effects on corporate governance and performance attributable to the largest ownership stakes by traditional investment managers and by hedge funds are studied separately. A sample of non-financial companies from the Russell 3000 index indicates that the influence of the largest shareholders on corporate governance and performance depends on shareholders’ motives and strategies. The authors employ regression analysis of panel data to construct an index of the quality of corporate governance, which then shows that traditional investment managers prefer to invest in companies that already have superior corporate governance and that these investors bring about further improvements in governance, which also benefit performance. The influence of hedge funds as the largest owners is the opposite. Hedge funds with large holdings tend to degrade corporate governance and have no effect on performance. This paper concludes that the different motives of large investors in a company become quite significant as ownership becomes increasingly concentrated.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.