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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">ecpolicy</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Экономическая политика</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Economic Policy</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">1994-5124</issn><issn pub-type="epub">2411-2658</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Economic Policy</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.18288/1994-5124-2021-2-8-33</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">ecpolicy-60</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>Налоговая политика</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>Tax Policy</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Влияние внутрирегиональной налоговой децентрализации на развитие доходной базы регионов</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Impact of Intraregional Tax Decentralization on a Region’s Tax Base</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Дерюгин</surname><given-names>А. Н.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>DERYUGIN</surname><given-names>A. N.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Александр Николаевич Дерюгин —  старший научный сотрудник лаборатории  исследований бюджетной политики Института  прикладных экономических исследований;  старший научный сотрудник центра межбюджетных отношений</p><p>119571, Москва, пр. Вернадского, 82</p><p>27006, Москва, Настасьинский пер., 3, стр. 2</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Aleksandr N. DERYUGIN</p><p>82, Vernadskogo pr., Moscow, 119571</p><p>3–2, Nastas’inskiy per., Moscow, 127006</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">anderyugin@mail.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Филиппова</surname><given-names>И. Н.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>FILIPPOVA</surname><given-names>I. N.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Ирина Николаевна Филиппова —  научный сотрудник лаборатории бюджетной политики; ассистент кафедры конкурентной и промышленной политики экономического факультета</p><p>125009, Москва, Газетный пер., 3–5, стр. 1  </p><p>119234, Москва, Ленинские Горы, 1, стр. 46</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Irina N. FILIPPOVA</p><p>3–5, Gazetnyy per., Moscow, 125009</p><p>1–46, Leninskie Gory, Moscow, 119234</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">filippova@365.iep.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-2"/></contrib><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Арлашкин</surname><given-names>И. Ю.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>ARLASHKIN</surname><given-names>I. Yu.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Игорь Юрьевич Арлашкин —  научный сотрудник лаборатории исследований  бюджетной политики Института прикладных экономических исследований</p><p>119571, Москва, пр. Вернадского, 82</p><p>27006, Москва, Настасьинский пер., 3, стр. 2</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Igor Yu. ARLASHKIN</p><p>82, Vernadskogo pr., Moscow, 119571</p><p>3–2, Nastas’inskiy per., Moscow, 127006</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">igor-arlashkin@mail.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>РАНХиГС; Научно-исследовательский финансовый институт Министерства финансов РФ</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration; Financial Research Institute of the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><aff-alternatives id="aff-2"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Институт экономической политики им. Е. Т. Гайдара; МГУ им. М.В. Ломоносова</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy; Lomonosov Moscow State University</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2021</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>28</day><month>04</month><year>2021</year></pub-date><volume>16</volume><issue>2</issue><elocation-id>8–33</elocation-id><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Дерюгин А.Н., Филиппова И.Н., Арлашкин И.Ю., 2021</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2021</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Дерюгин А.Н., Филиппова И.Н., Арлашкин И.Ю.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">DERYUGIN A.N., FILIPPOVA I.N., ARLASHKIN I.Y.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.ecpolicy.ru/jour/article/view/60">https://www.ecpolicy.ru/jour/article/view/60</self-uri><abstract><p>В статье рассматривается влияние передачи субъектами Российской Федерации на местный уровень нормативов отчислений от ряда налогов (налога, взимаемого в связи с применением упрощенной системы налогообложения (НУСН), налога на доходы физических лиц (НДФЛ), налога на имущество организаций (НИО) и налога на прибыль организаций) на рост доходной базы соответствующих налогов. Основная гипотеза, выдвигаемая авторами, состоит в том, что передача налогов в местные бюджеты оказывает положительное влияние на развитие доходной базы соответствующего налога. Этот результат будет тем выше, чем в большей степени местные власти смогут повлиять на деятельность плательщиков соответствующих налогов. Тестируется также гипотеза о том, что в бедных и богатых регионах передача налоговых доходов на местный уровень может оказывать разное влияние. Для проверки гипотез используются обобщенная модель панельных данных, модель межгрупповой оценки, модель с фиксированными эффектами (или внутригрупповой оценки) и гибридная модель. Используется оценка предельных эффектов с учетом уровня богатства региона. На основе результатов расчетов делается вывод о наличии положительного эффекта от передачи на местный уровень ряда налогов: взимаемого в связи с применением упрощенной системы налогообложения; на доходы физических лиц; на прибыль организаций и на имущество организаций. Этот вывод справедлив только для отдельных групп регионов. В частности, в отношении НУСН и НИО это оказалось справедливо для менее обеспеченных регионов, а в отношении НДФЛ — для беднейших. Авторами установлено, что динамика нормативов отчислений (передача дополнительных процентных пунктов норматива) не оказывает значимого положительного влияния на налогооблагаемую базу.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>The article examines the impact of intraregional tax decentralization in Russia on the growth of the tax bases in regard to simplified taxation system, personal income tax, corporate property tax and corporate income tax. The main hypothesis is that tax decentralization to local budgets has a positive effect on the growth of the revenue base of the corresponding tax, and the more local authorities can influence taxpayers, the stronger this effect. The paper also tests the hypothesis that tax decentralization to the local level can have different effects in poor versus rich regions. Hypotheses are tested using the pooled panel data model, the between-estimator model, the fixed effects model (or the withinestimator model), and the hybrid model. Marginal effects are estimated in order to take into account the level of regional wealth. Based on the results of the calculations, it is concluded that there is a positive effect from decentralizing the simplified taxation system, personal income tax, corporate income tax and corporate property tax, but only in certain groups of regions. In particular, with respect to simplified taxation system and corporate property tax, this turned out to be true for the less well-off regions, and with respect to personal income tax—for the poorest. At the same time, the dynamics of decentralization rates (decentralization of additional percentage points of the rate) do not have a significant positive effect on the tax base. The article was written on the basis of the RANEPA state assignment research program.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>региональные бюджеты</kwd><kwd>нормативы отчислений от налогов</kwd><kwd>налоговые стимулы</kwd><kwd>налоговая децентрализация</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>regional budgets</kwd><kwd>tax decentralization rates</kwd><kwd>tax stimuli</kwd><kwd>panel regression</kwd></kwd-group><funding-group><funding-statement xml:lang="ru">Статья подготовлена как часть научно-исследовательской работы в рамках государственного задания РАНХиГС.</funding-statement></funding-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Юшков А. 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