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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">ecpolicy</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Экономическая политика</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Economic Policy</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">1994-5124</issn><issn pub-type="epub">2411-2658</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Economic Policy</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.18288/1994-5124-2026-2-66-89</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">ecpolicy-662</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>Отраслевые рынки</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>Market Sectors</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Регулировать нельзя отпустить: o значении гибкой комиссии в такси</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Regulate or Ignore: The Role of Dynamic Commissions in Ride-Hailing Markets</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3512-6282</contrib-id><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Маркова</surname><given-names>О. А.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Markova</surname><given-names>O. A.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Ольга Анатольевна Маркова – кандидат экономических наук, старший научный сотрудник кафедры конкурентной и промышленной политики экономического факультета </p><p>119234, Москва, Ленинские Горы, 1, стр. 46</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Olga A. Markova, Cand. Sci. (Econ.), Senior Researcher, Department of Competition and Industrial Policy, Economics Faculty </p><p>1–46, Leninskie Gory, Moscow, 119234</p><p> </p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">markovaoa@outlook.com</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0347-8566</contrib-id><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Ставнийчук</surname><given-names>А. Ю</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Stavniychuk</surname><given-names>A. Y.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Анна Юрьевна Ставнийчук –кандидат экономических наук, научный сотрудник кафедры конкурентной и промышленной политики экономического факультета</p><p>119234, Москва, Ленинские Горы, 1, стр. 46</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Anna Y. Stavniychuk, Cand. Sci. (Econ.), Researcher, Department of Competition and Industrial Policy, Economics Faculty </p><p>1–46, Leninskie Gory, Moscow, 119234</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">stavniychukay@my.msu.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>МГУ им. М. В. Ломоносова</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Lomonosov Moscow State University</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2026</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>20</day><month>04</month><year>2026</year></pub-date><volume>21</volume><issue>2</issue><fpage>66</fpage><lpage>89</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Маркова О.А., Ставнийчук А.Ю., 2026</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2026</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Маркова О.А., Ставнийчук А.Ю.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Markova O.A., Stavniychuk A.Y.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.ecpolicy.ru/jour/article/view/662">https://www.ecpolicy.ru/jour/article/view/662</self-uri><abstract><p>В статье исследуется значение гибкой комиссии в функционировании платформ вызова такси как ключевого элемента ценообразования, напрямую влияющего на баланс интересов пассажиров, водителей и платформы. Гибкая комиссия рассматривается как часть механизма динамического ценообразования, используемого для балансировки спроса и предложения в условиях колебаний интенсивности поездок и пространственной неоднородности спроса. Цель работы заключается в анализе преимуществ и ограничений использования гибкой комиссии по сравнению с фиксированной, а также в изучении ее влияния на устойчивость платформенных рынков и их способность адаптироваться к изменениям рыночных условий. Методология включает теоретическое моделирование равновесий на рынке пассажирских перевозок такси, а также калибровку построенной структурной модели с использованием открытых данных, что позволяет проиллюстрировать результативность различных подходов к управлению комиссией. В статье показано, что гибкая комиссия способствует лучшей адаптации платформ к рыночным изменениям, снижению вероятности провалов мэтчинга и увеличению доходов водителей, что в итоге улучшает качество сервиса для пассажиров. В отличие от гибкой фиксированная комиссия ограничивает возможности платформ для поддержания баланса на рынке, что приводит к снижению прибыли, ухудшению качества обслуживания и негативным последствиям для общественного благосостояния. Это особенно важно в контексте обсуждения подходов к регулированию цифровых платформ, задействованных в пассажирском транспорте. Выводы статьи подчеркивают важность внедрения комбинированного подхода к управлению комиссией, который учитывает потребности всех сторон и способствует устойчивому развитию платформенных рынков.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>This paper examines the role of dynamic commissions for ride-hailing platforms and finds they are a crucial pricing mechanism that directly balances the interests of passengers, drivers, and the platform itself. Dynamic commissions are a part of the ride-hailing platforms’ pricing used to balance supply and demand when trip intensity fluctuates and spatial distribution of demand is uneven. The objective of this paper is to analyze the advantages and limitations of dynamic commissions compared to fixed ones and to understand how dynamic commissions affect the resilience of platform markets and their ability to adapt to evolving market conditions. The methodology employed theoretical modeling of market equilibria in ride-hailing markets and was subjected to empirical verification using publicly available data. This approach provided a comprehensive evaluation of various strategies for managing commissions. The findings demonstrate that flexible commissions enhance platform adaptability to market fluctuations, reduce matching failures, increase driver earnings, and ultimately improve quality of service for passengers. Conversely, fixed commissions constrain a platform’s ability to maintain market equilibrium and result in decreased profitability, deterioration of service, and reduction in social benefit from it. These findings have significant implications for regulatory frameworks governing digital platforms in passenger transportation markets. The study underscores the necessity of adopting a hybrid approach to commission management that accommodates the interests of all stakeholders and promotes sustainable development within platform markets.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>цифровые платформы</kwd><kwd>ценообразование</kwd><kwd>регулирование цен</kwd><kwd>провалы мэтчинга</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>digital platforms</kwd><kwd>pricing mechanisms</kwd><kwd>price regulation</kwd><kwd>matching failures</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Маркова О. А., Ставнийчук А. Ю., Ионкина К. А. Распределение ресурсов на основе динамического ценообразования: в чем сила? // Научные исследования экономического факультета. 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