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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">ecpolicy</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Экономическая политика</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Economic Policy</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">1994-5124</issn><issn pub-type="epub">2411-2658</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Economic Policy</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.18288/1994-5124-2020-6-42-65</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">ecpolicy-752</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>Налоговая политика</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>Tax Policy</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Собираемость налога на добавленную стоимость: выявление новых детерминант</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Collection Efficiency of the Value Added Tax: Identifying New Determinants</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Леонов</surname><given-names>Е. А.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Leonov</surname><given-names>E. A.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Елисей Александрович Леонов — научный сотрудник лаборатории исследований бюджетной политики Института прикладных экономических исследований; научный сотрудник лаборатории развития налоговой системы</p><p>119571, Москва, пр. Вернадского, 84</p><p>125009, Москва, Газетный пер., 3–5</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Elisei A. Leonov. Institute of Applied Economic Research</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">leonov-ea@ranepa.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Соколов</surname><given-names>И. А.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Sokolov</surname><given-names>I. A.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Илья Александрович Соколов — кандидат экономических наук, заведующий лабораторией исследований бюджетной политики Института прикладных экономических исследований; директор Института макроэкономических исследований</p><p>119571, Москва, пр. Вернадского, 84)</p><p>119285, Москва, ул. Пудовкина, 4а</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Ilya A. Sokolov, Cand. Sci. (Econ.). Institute of Applied Economic Research</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">Sokolov-ia@ranepa.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-2"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>РАНХиГС; Институт экономической политики им. Е. Т. Гайдара</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration; Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><aff-alternatives id="aff-2"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>РАНХиГС; Всероссийская академия внешней торговли</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2020</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>28</day><month>12</month><year>2020</year></pub-date><volume>15</volume><issue>6</issue><fpage>42</fpage><lpage>65</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Леонов Е.А., Соколов И.А., 2020</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2020</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Леонов Е.А., Соколов И.А.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Leonov E.A., Sokolov I.A.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.ecpolicy.ru/jour/article/view/752">https://www.ecpolicy.ru/jour/article/view/752</self-uri><abstract><p>Работа посвящена факторному анализу собираемости налога на добавленную стоимость. Статья развивает идеи, представленные в литературе, проверяя устойчивость полученных ранее результатов, но уже на гораздо более широком наборе данных и предлагая новые детерминанты. Для этого была сформирована база данных более чем по 80 странам на временнóм горизонте с 1991 года по 2018-й. Согласно полученным оценкам, важным фактором, влияющим на поступления налога, как и в более ранних работах, стала доля сельского хозяйства в экономике. Увеличение ее на 1 п.п. способствует сокращению собираемости на 0,7 п.п. Результаты оценивания показали также, что среди традиционных детерминант, приводящих по характеру своего воздействия к недопоступлениям налога, наиболее значительную роль играют уровень базовой ставки (средняя эластичность –1,58), масштаб теневого сектора (увеличение его доли в ВВП на 1 п.п. может приводить к сокращению собираемости на 0,7 п.п.), отношение импорта к конечному потреблению (эластичность 0,14). Кроме того, в работе проверяются новые гипотезы, получившие актуальность в последние пятнадцать лет и не рассмотренные в литературе ранее. Так, авторами установлено положительное влияние цифровых решений администрирования НДС: функционирование систем электронного декларирования повышает собираемость в среднем на 2,2 п.п. Но еще большее значение имеет фактор информационного сотрудничества внутри союзов с открытыми границами. Согласно полученным оценкам, эффект от усиления информационной кооперации между налоговыми службами стран — участниц ЕАЭС может составить от 7 до 10 п.п. к уровню собираемости в каждой из них. Таким образом, развитие цифровых систем как внутреннего администрирования, так и информационного обмена (с налоговыми службами стран-союзниц) существенно снижает «недобор» налога.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>The work is devoted to a factor analysis of VAT collection. The article develops the ideas represented in the literature, testing the stability of the previously obtained results, but on a much wider database (formed for more than 80 countries on a time horizon from 1991 to 2018) and new determinants. According to the estimates, an important factor affecting tax revenues, as noted in earlier works, is the share of agriculture in the economy, an increase in which by 1 percentage point contributes to a decrease in C-efficiency by 0.7 percentage points. The estimation results have also shown three factors that stand out among the traditional determinants affecting the compliance gap: the standard tax rate with average elasticity of –1.58, the shadow economy with average elasticity of –0.71, and also the ratio of imports to final consumption with an elasticity of 0.14. In addition, the article tests new hypotheses that have become relevant in the last 15 years and have not been considered in the literature before. The authors have established a positive effect of digital decisions of VAT administration: the functioning of electronic declaration systems increases the collection rate by an average of 2.2 percentage points. However, even more important is the factor of information cooperation within unions with open borders: according to the estimates, the effect of strengthening information cooperation between the tax services of the EAEU member states can be up to 7–10 percentage points to the current level of C-efficiency in each of them. Thus, the development of digital systems, both for internal administration and networking (between the tax services of the allied countries), can significantly reduce the compliance gap.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>собираемость НДС</kwd><kwd>уклонение от налогов</kwd><kwd>электронное декларирование</kwd><kwd>факторы собираемости</kwd><kwd>цифровые системы налогового администрирования</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>VAT collection</kwd><kwd>tax evasion</kwd><kwd>electronic declaration</kwd><kwd>collection factors</kwd><kwd>digital tax administration systems</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Кнобель А., Синельников-Мурылев С., Соколов И. Качество администрирования налога на добавленную стоимость в странах ОЭСР и России // Прикладная эконометрика. 2011. Т. 21. № 1. 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