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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">ecpolicy</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Экономическая политика</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Economic Policy</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">1994-5124</issn><issn pub-type="epub">2411-2658</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Economic Policy</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.18288/1994-5124-2026-3-26-53</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">ecpolicy-769</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>Налоговая политика</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>Tax Policy</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Фискальные последствия роста долговой нагрузки российского бизнеса</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Fiscal Consequences of the Escalating Corporate Debt Burden in Russia</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0350-1885</contrib-id><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Борисов</surname><given-names>О. И.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Borisov</surname><given-names>O. I.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Олег Игоревич Борисов, Кандидат экономических наук, доцент</p><p>127083, Москва, ул. Верхняя Масловка, 15</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Oleg I. Borisov, Cand. Sci. (Econ.), Associate Professor</p><p>15, Verkhnyaya Maslovka ul., Moscow, 127083</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">oborisov@fa.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Финансовый университет при Правительстве Российской Федерации</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Financial University Under the Government of the Russian Federation</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2026</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>28</day><month>06</month><year>2026</year></pub-date><volume>21</volume><issue>3</issue><fpage>26</fpage><lpage>53</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Борисов О.И., 2026</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2026</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Борисов О.И.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Borisov O.I.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.ecpolicy.ru/jour/article/view/769">https://www.ecpolicy.ru/jour/article/view/769</self-uri><abstract><p>В условиях неуклонного роста долговой нагрузки российского бизнеса всё б льшую актуальность приобретает проблема стимулирования его капитализации, а также противодействия использованию заемного финансирования для оптимизации налоговой нагрузки. В статье на основе данных годовой бухгалтерской (финансовой) отчетности организаций, представленных на государственном информационном ресурсе ФНС России, впервые проведена оценка налоговых последствий ограничения вычета процентных расходов как для российской экономики в целом, так и в отраслевом разрезе. Предложены модели оценки фискальных эффектов ограничения процентных расходов долей EBITDA и EBIT. Установлено, что введение ограничения на вычет в размере 30% EBITDA значительно увеличит налоговые доходы бюджета и позволит сгенерировать 330–583 млрд руб. Этим ограничением будет затронута лишь малая доля компаний (примерно 0,3–0,5%) с высоким уровнем задолженности, что позволит сдерживать размывание налоговой базы путем ее смещения в зоны с низкими ставками налога на прибыль организаций, а также косвенно простимулирует капитализацию компаний, ограничивая чрезмерный леверидж. Ограничение вычета в размере 30% EBIT затронет примерно вдвое б льшую долю организаций и нанесет экономике ущерб, поскольку охватит больше организаций с обычным уровнем процентных расходов. В отраслевом разрезе основную налоговую нагрузку понесут оптовая и розничная торговля, обрабатывающая промышленность, транспортировка и хранение. Умеренное увеличение налоговой нагрузки при обоих подходах произойдет в добывающей промышленности, сферах недвижимости, информации и связи. На организациях остальных видов деятельности введение ограничений на вычет процентов практически не скажется. Тем не менее немногие затронутые этим правилом компании будут нести значительно более высокую налоговую нагрузку, что повлияет на их инвестиционное поведение, особенно в отраслях, зависящих от заемного финансирования.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>As the debt burden of Russian businesses continues to increase steadily, the need to stimulate corporate capitalization and discourage the use of debt financing for tax optimization purposes has become increasingly urgent. Based on data from annual accounting and financial statements of organizations provided by the Federal Tax Service of Russia, this article presents the first comprehensive assessment of the tax consequences of limiting interest expense deductibility for both the Russian economy and across individual industries. The study proposes models for assessing the fiscal effects of limiting interest expenses as a proportion of both EBITDA and EBIT and concludes that limiting interest deductibility to 30% of EBITDA would increase state tax revenues by approximately 330-583 billion rubles (excluding financial and insurance sectors). This change in policy would affect only the relatively small proportion of companies (approximately 0.3-0.5%) with high levels of debt and would help in curbing erosion of the tax base when firms shift profit to jurisdictions with lower corporate income tax rates. It would also indirectly stimulate corporate capitalization by constraining excessive leverage. In comparison, capping interest deductions at 30% of EBIT would affect about twice as many companies and could negatively impact the economy, as it would affect firms with only moderate or “normal” interest expenditures. Sectoral analysis reveals that the primary tax burden from either approach would fall on wholesale and retail trade, manufacturing, transportation, and storage industries. Extractive industries, real estate operations, and information and communications sectors would experience only a moderate increase in tax burden, and such interest deduction restrictions would have minimal impact on organizations in other economic sectors. However, the relatively small number of companies affected by these rules in less debt-dependent sectors would nevertheless bear a significantly higher tax burden, which could materially influence their investment behavior and financial strategies, particularly in industries traditionally reliant on debt financing for growth and operations.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>процентные расходы</kwd><kwd>корпоративный долг</kwd><kwd>перераспределение нагрузки</kwd><kwd>налог на прибыль</kwd><kwd>фискальная политика</kwd><kwd>EBITDA</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>interest expense</kwd><kwd>corporate debt</kwd><kwd>burden shifting</kwd><kwd>income tax</kwd><kwd>fiscal policy</kwd><kwd>EBITDA</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Branzoli N., Caiumi A. How Effective Is an Incremental ACE in Addressing the Debt Bias? 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