Improving Compliance With Antitrust Measures Through Commercial Policies

Abstract

Commercial policies for major market participants were introduced in Russia about a decade ago in order to improve compliance with antitrust provisions and as a partial substitute for them. Experts were initially rather sceptical about this move because it was a departure from prevailing international practices and also imposed additional regulatory burdens on companies. This article examines whether commercial policies have been an effective way to improve antitrust compliance by Russia’s pharmaceutical companies, reduce erroneous accusations, and drive down the costs of anti trust enforcement for both the antitrust authorities and market players. Analysis of the commercial policies of several large pharmaceutical companies indicates that their rules are meant to address the abuse of market dominance in the sector which has been alleged by the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Russian Federation (FAS). Inasmuch as a refusal to supply counts as an infringement of Russia’s legislation on competition and also in view of particular aspects of competition in the Russian pharmaceutical markets, such commercial policies have great potential, first, to diminish erroneous accusations and, second, to reduce the costs of enforcing the legislation on competition. The authors conclude that introducing commercial policies has been beneficial for both consumers (as represented by the FAS) and the pharmaceutical companies.