Preview

Экономическая политика

Расширенный поиск

The Forward Guidance Puzzle and Anchored Inflation Expectations

https://doi.org/10.18288/1994-5124-2024-6-6-25

Аннотация

In recent years, central banks have turned to forward guidance as a key tool of monetary policy. However, standard DSGE models overestimate the impact of forward guidance on the economy, a phenomenon known as the “forward guidance puzzle.” In the model employed, the reaction of firms to a central bank’s announcements depends on the degree of anchoring of inflation expectations. When firms do not revise their forecasts much in response to inflation surprises, the effects of forward guidance shocks are attenuated. Furthermore, an increase in the Taylor rule coefficients implies a faster reversion of inflation and output to their steady state levels, thus resulting in more anchored inflation expectations and dampened effects of forward guidance announcements. However, the central bank's exclusive focus on price stability eliminates forward guidance effects. This paper also studies the dependence of forward guidance on fiscal policy, which arises in a nonRicardian economy. We show that the initial effects of the central bank’s announcements become considerably stronger when steady state debt is positive, whereas a stronger reaction of fiscal policy to debt fluctuations attenuates the power of forward guidance.

Об авторах

А. D. Drobysheva
National Research University Higher School of Economics
Россия

Alexandra D. Drobysheva - Research Intern at the International Laboratory for Macroeconomic Analysis.

11, Pokrovskiy bul., Moscow, 109028



S. А. Merzlyakov
National Research University Higher School of Economics
Россия

Sergey A. Merzlyakov - Cand. Sci. (Econ.), Assistant Professor of the Department of Theoretical Economics at the Faculty of Economic Sciences, Deputy Head of the International Laboratory for Macroeconomic Analysis.

11, Pokrovskiy bul., Moscow, 109028



Список литературы

1. Afrouzi H., Yang C. Dynamic Rational Inattention and the Phillips Curve. CESifo, Working Paper Series no. 8840, 2021.

2. Andrade P., Gaballo G., Mengus E., Mojon B. Forward Guidance and Heterogeneous Beliefs. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2019, vol. 11(3), pp. 1-29.

3. Angeletos G.-M., Lian C. Forward Guidance Without Common Knowledge. American Economic Review, 2018, vol. 108(9), pp. 2477-2512.

4. Ascari G., Florio A., Gobbi A. Controlling Inflation With Timid Monetary-Fiscal Regime Changes. International Economic Review, 2020, vol. 61(2), pp. 1001-1024.

5. Ascari G., Sbordone A. M. The Macroeconomics of Trend Inflation. Journal of Economic Literature, 2014, vol. 52(3), pp. 679-739.

6. Bernanke B. The New Tools of Monetary Policy. American Economic Review, 2020, vol. 110(4), pp. 943-983.

7. Bhatnagar A. Monetary Policy With Non-Ricardian Households. Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 2023, vol. 89, pp. 12-26.

8. Blanchard O. J. Debt, Deficits, and Finite Horizons. Journal of Political Economy, 1985, vol. 93(2), pp. 223-247.

9. Bodenstein M., Hebden J., Nunes R. Imperfect Credibility and the Zero Lower Bound. Journal of Monetary Economics, 2012, vol. 59(2), pp. 135-149.

10. Caballero R. J., Farhi E. The Safety Trap. Review of Economic Studies, 2018, vol. 85(1), pp. 223-274.

11. Calvo G. A. Staggered Prices in a Utility-Maximizing Framework. Journal of Monetary Economics, 1983, vol. 12(3), pp. 383-398.

12. Campbell J. R., Evans C. L., Fisher J. D. M., Justiniano A. Macroeconomic Effects of FOMC Forward Guidance. The Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2012, vol. 43(1), pp. 1-80.

13. Campbell J. R., Ferroni F., Fisher D. M., Melosi L. The Limits of Forward Guidance. Journal of Monetary Economics, 2019, vol. 108, pp. 118-134.

14. Caramp N., Silva D. H. Monetary Policy and Wealth Effects: The Role of Risk and Heterogeneity. CESifo, Working Paper Series no. 11049, 2023.

15. Carvalho C., Eusepi S., Moench E., Preston B. Anchored Inflation Expectations. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2023, vol. 15, pp. 1-47.

16. Cochrane J. The New-Keynesian Liquidity Trap. Journal of Monetary Economics, 2017, vol. 92, pp. 47-63.

17. Coenen G., Ehrmann M., Gaballo G., Hoffmann P., Nakov A., Nardelli S., Persson E., Strasser G. Communication of Monetary Policy in Unconventional Times. Frankfurt am Main, European Central Bank, Working Paper Series no. 2080, 2017.

18. Coibion O., Gorodnichenko Y. Information Rigidity and the Expectations Formation Process: A Simple Framework and New Facts. American Economic Review, 2015, vol. 105(8), pp. 2644-2678.

19. Corhay A., Kung H., Morales G. QE in the Fiscal Theory: A Risk-Based View. Toronto, Rotman School of Management, Working Paper no. 2981085, 2017.

20. Del Negro M., Giannoni M., Patterson S. The Forward Guidance Puzzle. Journal of Political Economy Macroeconomics, 2023, vol. 1(1), pp. 43-79.

21. Gabaix X. A Behavioral New Keynesian Model. vol. 110(8), pp. 2271-2327.

22. Jorgensen P., Lansing K. J. Anchored Inflation Expectations and the Slope of the Phillips Curve. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Working Paper Series no. 27, 2019.

23. Leeper E. M., Leith C. Understanding Inflation as a Joint Monetary-Fiscal Phenomenon. In: Taylor J. B., Uhlig H. (eds.). Handbook of Macroeconomics. Amsterdam, Elsevier Press, 2016.

24. Leith C., Von Thadden L. Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interactions in a New Keynesian Model With Capital Accumulation and Non-Ricardian Consumers. Journal of Economic Theory, 2008, vol. 140(1), pp. 279-313.

25. McClung N. The Power of Forward Guidance and the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level. International Journal of Central Banking, 2021, vol. 17(71), pp. 1-57.

26. McKay A., Nakamura E., Steinsson J. The Power of Forward Guidance Revisited. American Economic Review, 2016, vol. 106(10), pp. 3133-3158.

27. Rigon M., Zanetti F. Optimal Monetary Policy and Fiscal Policy Interaction in a NonRicardian Economy. International Journal of Central Banking, 2018, vol. 14(3), pp. 389-436.

28. Stock J. H., Watson M. W. Modeling Inflation After the Crisis. Macroeconomic Challenges: The Decade Ahead. Proceedings of the Jackson Hole Economic Policy Symposium, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 2010.

29. Stock J. H., Watson M. W. Why Has U.S. Inflation Become Harder to Forecast? Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2007, vol. 39, pp. 3-34.

30. Woodford M. Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2003.


Рецензия

Для цитирования:


Drobysheva А.D., Merzlyakov S.А. The Forward Guidance Puzzle and Anchored Inflation Expectations. Экономическая политика. 2024;19(6):6-25. https://doi.org/10.18288/1994-5124-2024-6-6-25

For citation:


Drobysheva A.D., Merzlyakov S.A. The Forward Guidance Puzzle and Anchored Inflation Expectations. Economic Policy. 2024;19(6):6-25. https://doi.org/10.18288/1994-5124-2024-6-6-25

Просмотров: 217


Creative Commons License
Контент доступен под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.


ISSN 1994-5124 (Print)
ISSN 2411-2658 (Online)