The Russian Inspections: Continuous and Uninterrupted
https://doi.org/10.18288/1994-5124-2022-3-98-123
Abstract
The paper presents a new take on the Russian state-sanctioned inspections. Scheduled and surprise inspections interconnect. More so, they make up chains of events: a scheduled inspection can result in several surprise ones aimed at correcting the original violation. The paper defines these chains as continuous inspections. In order to prove this thesis, the paper demonstrates that some inspections are a continuous and uninterrupted affair, a constant interplay between an inspectorate and an inspected organization. The research uses a wide array of datasets showing the actual distribution of inspectorate activities by ownership of organizations, their size, and type of economic activity. The paper analyzes the limitations of a risk-oriented approach and its application. The research distinguishes between the inspectorates focusing on organizations and real estate objects belonging to these organizations. This delineation highlights the importance of considering the geographical distribution of inspectorates for providing a proper evaluation of their respective administrative workloads. The discussion analyzes the possible implications of the proposed framework. The current institutional setting provides minimal opportunities for optimization or targeting. Therefore, ignoring the continuous nature of the inspection leads to a distorted view of administrative workload. The improvement of the quality of rules and business processes is the key to the reform’s success.
Supporting agencies: The research was funded by the Russian Science Foundation (project 17-18-01618).
About the Author
R. K. Kuchakov
European University at St. Petersburg
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Ruslan K. Kuchakov - Junior Researcher, Institute for the Rule of Law
6/1a, Gagarinskaya ul., 191187, St. Petersburg
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Review
For citations:
Kuchakov R.K. The Russian Inspections: Continuous and Uninterrupted. Economic Policy. 2022;17(3):98-123. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.18288/1994-5124-2022-3-98-123
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