REGIONAL ECONOMY
The current geopolitical situation has prompted many foreign firms to withdraw from the Russian economy. This calls for somehow replacing them, especially in order to maintain economic growth in Russia’s regions, by encouraging formation of new Russian companies capable of supplanting the departed firms and by stimulating entrepreneurial activity in general. The impact of trends in corporate activity on regional economic growth in Russia has not been systematically examined before, and this article is intended to address that deficiency. The article focuses on how two particular components of overall economic change — the entry and exit of commercial companies into markets — affect the indicators of gross regional product. The paper proposes an econometric model which confirms that the entry and exit of Russian companies are factors in regional economic growth. During the period studied from 2005 to 2020, a significant interregional discrepancy in gross product growth rates was observed alongside a progressive decrease in new firms appearing and an increase in exits by existing companies. For the country as a whole after 2016, the absolute number of companies withdrawing from operations constantly exceeded the absolute number of those starting up. This had a pronounced negative impact on economic growth rates in most of the regions. That those entries by companies were procyclical is demonstrated by the fact that during periods of economic growth the number of entries of new firms increased, while during periods of crises and recessions such entries decreased. In 2022 the Russian government adopted anti-crisis programs, which the author finds partially useful for offsetting negative trends in the operations of firms and stabilizing the economic situation in the regions. Among the main elements of these programs are moratoriums on business inspections, mitigation of liability for offenses, preferential lending, tax incentives, and subsidizing expenses.
Despite the limited markets now available to entrepreneurs and the disruption of supply chains, many indicators of business activity in Russia did not decrease in 2022. However, there are significant differences between regions in their response to these external shocks. The article evaluates factors that brought about changes in the most pertinent indicator of business activity – the growth in the number of new small and medium-sized businesses. First, in regions where economic ties with the countries that imposed sanctions were weaker, there were more such new businesses. In some regions that produce raw materials, those countries annually accounted for more than 80% of exports and imports. Second, the withdrawal of companies from Russia may open up certain market niches (in trade, IT, other services, and processing). The revenue of enterprises from countries deemed unfriendly by the Russian government was about 16 trillion rubles, or about one tenth of the market. The hypothesis that this amount of revenue had a positive effect on the number of newly created small and medium-sized enterprises because of less competition in certain market niches was confirmed provisionally and with a low degree of significance. Third, just as the online sector provided one way of adapting to a crisis during the pandemic, the ubiquitous reach of online trading platforms along with access to parallel imports came into play. In regions where businesses and the public placed more orders for goods and services via the internet, more new enterprises were created. The hypothesis that proximity to unfriendly countries had a negative impact on business activity in the regions at their borders was confirmed. And vice versa, the proximity to Georgia and Azerbaijan had a positive effect as the flow of goods and tourists was redirected toward the North Caucasus. The scale and diversity of markets due to large economic agglomerations in the regions was also beneficial. These observations bear on a number of recommendations.
Management
The paper explores different approaches to defining the concepts of ESG (Environmental, Social, Governance) and sustainable development and substantiates the position that ESG transformation of management systems is the ideological embodiment of a comprehensive solution to economic, social, and environmental problems facing the state, business, and society. In this regard, it is advisable to view the seventeen UN sustainable development goals (SDGs) through the prism of a set of specific mechanisms to ensure that their achievement is based on ESG ideology. In essence, ESG ideology integrates the triunity of economic, environmental, and social principles inherent in all SDGs, and is a tool for verifying the feasibility of the specific mechanisms that are developed and implemented to achieve each of these goals. Applying an interdisciplinary approach, which is preferable for research of sustainable development issues and assessment of key factors for ESG transformation of management systems, the authors reveal manageable and unmanageable risks, define trends for skill development in managers capable of its implementation, and identify the nuances of achieving sustainable development goals through increased efficiency of interaction between government, business, and society. Specific examples demonstrate that while good practices of the influence of developed civil society institutions on SDG achievement exist, its role is still underestimated, which is a significant hindrance to the achievement of a balance between meeting the objectively existing needs of the population and ensuring no harm to future generations. Research results can be used by the professional community interested in promoting the ESG agenda and achieving sustainable development goals based on ESG transformation of public and corporate management systems.
Economic History
The paper presents an overview derived from the Russian translation of Thra’inn Eggertsson’s book “Imperfect Institutions: Possibilities and Limits of Reform.” Eggertson, who is a professor at the University of Iceland and Hertie School in Berlin, employs the methodology and achievements of the new institutional economics to survey the factors which affect the sustainability of institutions that are inefficient in terms of economic development. He describes and discusses the history of some norms that were preserved for several centuries in Iceland to regulate agriculture, in particular cattle breeding and fishing, as well as to provide mutual assistance within local communities. Eggertsson shows that for a long time these norms were a source of the island’s economic backwardness; and he explains why Icelandic society’s farming elite not only did not seek to change those norms despite their seemingly obvious imperfection and harmful consequences, but instead carefully protected them and avoided even thinking about any changes. The historical example of Iceland’s persistent loyalty to inefficient institutions is supplemented by a theoretical discussion of the role of institutions in economic development. Eggertson argues that neither an accumulation of factors of production nor the development of technologies are sufficient for economic growth without the development of social technologies and institutions in particular. At the same time, the evolution of institutions as ways for economic entities to interact is linked to the evolution of social models, behavioral patterns, and the rules people follow; this linkage underlines the importance of learning and persuasion in the course of any institutional changes. The book also contains a discussion of various aspects of institutional reforms that can affect their success or failure.
During the years in emigration that followed the abortive revolution of 1905 and the political repression that accelerated during 1907, the Bolshevik and Menshevik fractions of the RSDRP experienced chronic financial difficulties. Subscriptions became an unreliable source of income and the fractions would attempt to maintain solvency by, inter alia, obtaining donations and loans from benefactors. In June 1907 the notorious robbery at the Tiflis State Bank made for a temporary improvement in the finances of the Bolsheviks, as did the bequest of Nikolay Pavlovich Shmit, income from which was acquired during the years 1908–1911. During the “Meeting of the Expanded Editorial Board of Proletariy” of 21–30 June 1909, a Conflict Commission considered the matter of a loan that had been granted to the Bolshevik Centre in 1907 by Anna Ivanovna Umnova through the agency of Leonid Krasin, and recommended that the loan should be repaid. However, schism in the Bolshevik fraction delayed full repayment until 1910, when the debt was redeemed not by the “Left Bolsheviks” or by the Lenin group, but by the Foreign Bureau (ZBTsK) of a temporarily “united” RSDRP. The case of Umnova provides insight into how the Bolsheviks managed their finances; helps to explain the breakdown in relations between Krasin and Lenin; and illustrates the extent to which Lenin was prepared to disregard collective decision making.
ISSN 2411-2658 (Online)