Financial repression refers to the distorting effect of certain government policies on the operation of the financial sector. Several empirical studies of financial repression point out that financial repression retards economic growth by decreasing investment activity in the economy, but the impact of financial repression on inflationary processes has not been adequately studied. This paper examines how inflation and other macroeconomic indicators would respond to an oil price shock when financial repression is or is not in place. Financial repression affects household consumption, and that increases the inflationary response to external shocks. The article constructs a standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model of a small exporting economy operating under financial repression. The financial repression takes the form of a government cap on interest rates for a certain proportion of loans available to households. The model is calibrated to resemble the economy of Kazakhstan, where the policy rate for lending applies to more than 20% of the credit market. However, the calibration and structure of the model are broadly typical of exporting economies, and the conclusions drawn from the model are therefore qualitatively applicable to exporting economies in general. The model demonstrates that financial repression increases the impact of external shocks not only on inflation, but also on output, employment, and the effective interest rate. When the effectiveness of a central bank’s ability to maintain inflation targets with minimal volatility is judged according to the Taylor Rule, these results imply that financial repression makes it more difficult for central banks to reach that goal.

The article considers an abstract economy which has limited legal opportunities to modernize its technology. As technology and human capital interact, this limitation also impacts educational choices. Economic agents who are expecting a slowdown in technological modernization become less motivated to augment their human capital. Projecting that model onto Russia’s economy under sanctions indicates that the pace will slacken both in technological modernization and in the accumulation of human capital. As it is clearly too early to make predictions in granular detail regarding Russian industries, the article focusses instead on the country’s various regions. The theory of economic complexity is employed to calculate indexes reflecting the sophistication of the more complex regional industries and universities. The correlation between types of economic activity and university specialization at the regional level is also estimated. The conclusion is that regional economies featuring a more fully developed complex manufacturing sector also have a more developed university system as well as a tighter correlation between the structure of the economy and of the higher education system. These regions may be more affected by sanctions because it becomes more difficult for the modern technologies which are intensively used in complex industries to penetrate the Russian economy. To reduce the impact of restrictions on technological development and education, efforts should be made to restore the participation of Russian companies in global technology chains.

Concentration of corporate ownership has increased worldwide during recent years, especially in the holdings of the largest investors. The paper examines this trend in order to understand how changes in the stakes of the largest shareholders affect corporate governance and performance. In order to take into account the different goals and motives among institutional investors, the effects on corporate governance and performance attributable to the largest ownership stakes by traditional investment managers and by hedge funds are studied separately. A sample of non-financial companies from the Russell 3000 index indicates that the influence of the largest shareholders on corporate governance and performance depends on shareholders’ motives and strategies. The authors employ regression analysis of panel data to construct an index of the quality of corporate governance, which then shows that traditional investment managers prefer to invest in companies that already have superior corporate governance and that these investors bring about further improvements in governance, which also benefit performance. The influence of hedge funds as the largest owners is the opposite. Hedge funds with large holdings tend to degrade corporate governance and have no effect on performance. This paper concludes that the different motives of large investors in a company become quite significant as ownership becomes increasingly concentrated.

Russia is one of the world’s chief emitters of greenhouse gases even though it has vast potential to use zero-carbon energy resources, particularly biofuels. In order to prevent global warming above 1.5–2°C, Russia announced its commitment under the UN Paris Agreement to reach carbon neutrality by 2060. Analysis of the low-carbon development scenarios based on the RU-TIMES model developed for Russia indicates that cost-effective pathways toward deep decarbonization of the national economy are not feasible without extensive use of biofuels. By 2050 bioenergy together with improved energy efficiency, solar and wind power, and carbon capture and storage technologies could result in CO2 emissions from domestic energy production that are 80–90% less than in 2010. Russia’s rich store of natural resources and innovative technologies offer opportunities to increase domestic production of bioenergy by 2050 to levels comparable with the output from all of its nuclear and hydropower plants. Russia’s competitive advantages could make it a world leader in modern bioenergy markets, especially during the transition to green energy, decarbonization of the global economy, and international carbon pricing. However, developing bioenergy is not a priority for either the Russian Energy Strategy Through 2035 or the Low-Carbon Development Strategy Through 2050. This study provides more accurate estimates of the potential for bioenergy to fulfill Russia’s Paris Agreement commitments and thoroughly decarbonize its economy.

An automated market maker (AMM) is a relatively new trading protocol that is currently used by some decentralized cryptocurrency exchanges (DEX). An AMM differs from traditional market makers by being “depersonalized” because it is simply a smart contract that taps into an underlying liquidity pool (LP) which is the common property of participating investors rather than in the inventory of a single market maker. The article considers the applicability of AMMs to traditional (fiat) financial markets and, if applicable, whether AMMs might operate as a “sustaining” or “disruptive” technology as defined in The Innovator’s Dilemma. The article begins by showing the validity of taking up such questions, outlines the underlying motivations for moving to an AMM, and argues that AMMs present a challenge to the traditional financial infrastructure and to continuous matching of buyers and sellers via a central limit order book (CLOB) as a predominant trading protocol. AMM structure and algorithms are described, and various AMM models are classified according to their indifference curve design. How AMM pricing relates to market pricing and how arbitrage helps in reaching alignment are then examined together with related problems for traders (slippage, frontrunning, rug pull) and for the investors participating in an LP (impermanent loss, the vulnerability of smart contracts). The article then proposes that, in the near term, AMMs have problems that make their application to traditional markets unlikely. However, in the medium term and provided that certain necessary conditions are met, AMMs in some form may prompt interest outside cryptocurrency markets as a sustaining or even disruptive technology.

The aim of this study is to test the weak form of the efficient market hypothesis for the most highly capitalized cryptocurrencies in various categories (means of payment, payment systems, blockchain platforms, and utility tokens) after March 2020. The study uses standard statistical tools – autocorrelation tests and series tests – to evaluate the hypothesis, which is then tested in another way by attempting to arrive at profitable trading strategies using information from traditional markets to decide whether to open positions in various cryptocurrencies. The results of the statistical tests conducted demonstrate an increase in the efficiency of the cryptocurrency market and a consequent reduction in the profitability of speculative trading based on past prices (technical analysis). The trading simulations show that the increased sensitivity of the cryptocurrency market to the dynamics of traditional markets after March 2020 made it possible to find trading strategies that take into account market information and are able to generate significant excess returns compared to a “buy and hold” strategy during the downturn in the digital asset markets (2021–2022) for certain cryptocurrencies (Bitcoin, Dash, Zcash, Lumen). This supports the conclusion that the efficiency of the cryptocurrency market is gradually increasing in terms of identifying trading opportunities through technical analysis. However, the increase in comovement with the traditional market would suggest that it is inefficient to predict the returns of cryptocurrencies based on external information, which turned out to be irrelevant in other studies that examined earlier periods.

One hundred years ago Lenin dictated what became known as his Political Testament. He recommended alterations in the administrative system of the Party and of the country. He also proposed removing Stalin as the Party’s General Secretary. An analysis of Lenin’s last works leads to several conclusions. It lays to rest the claim that these texts were partially falsified. Furthermore, Lenin makes only cursory mention of industrialization. His dream – total cooperation of peasantry – was not feasible, and the kolkhoz system had nothing to do with cooperation. What worried Lenin were two potential rifts. One was a split between workers and peasants in which the peasants would make common cause with the urban bourgeoisie. The second was a schism within the Communist Party leadership brought on by conflict between Stalin and Trotsky. The first split might be avoided if the Communist Party implemented adequate policies. To prevent the second split, Lenin suggested expanding the Central Committee by including more workers. The People’s Commissariat of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate (Rabkrin) was to be merged with the Central Control Commission (CCC). This would improve the state’s administrative apparatus and provide control over the Politburo of the Party’s Central Committee. Lenin’s comrades did not follow his recommendations. Although the CCC and Rabkrin were merged, no control over the Politburo was established. The membership of the Central Committee was not expanded. Stalin remained General Secretary, and he avoided the rifts which Lenin had anticipated in a way quite different from Lenin’s proposals.